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Queensland army units manifested a more than proportionate share 
of the courage that we now acknowledge is the great legacy of the 
Gallipoli campaign. Misguided in concept, inept in planning, and 
naive in terms of military doctrine, the campaign at Anzac Cove is 
redeemed by the qualities which were highlighted in individual soldiers, 
and in the Units to which they belonged. 
The toll of Queenslanders who were kiUed or wounded, was high. 
Queensland units which took part in the initial assault at Anzac Cove 
included the Ninth Battalion (of the 2nd Infantry Brigade), the 
Fifteenth Battalion (of the 4th AustraUan Infantry Brigade), the 
Second Light Horse, the 7th Battery of the 3rd ArtiUery Brigade (1st 
Division), and the 3rd Field Ambulance. Expatriate Queenslanders 
served at Gallipoli in many other AustraUan units, raised as regional 
units in other States. 
Surviving wounded Australian soldiers from the initial assault at 
Gallipoli were evacuated to the beach at Anzac Cove. They were held 
in the shelter of No.l Casualty Clearing Hospital [later caUed 
"Station"], at a site which was afforded some protection by the 
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sloping ground which rose from the sea. From that site, the wounded 
were loaded on board tows, for evacuation to the Hospital Ships 
standing off shore. 
Austraha's No.l Casualty Clearing Station served in both World 
Wars, and from 1956 was located (as an Army Reserve [CMF] Unit) 
in Fortitude Valley in Brisbane until 1976 when its name was changed 
to No.2 Field Hospital. As Australia's first casualty clearing station 
it holds a special place in the history of AustraUan mUitary medicine. 
On that first Anzac Day all wounded Queenslanders passed through 
it, many to survive and return to active life. A perspective of the Unit's 
role on the beach at Anzac affords an insight into the evolution of 
contemporary management policies for the treatment of mass 
casualties. 
This account reviews, from a medical perspective, the origins of 
the modern casualty evacuation chain. 
A NEW TYPE OF ARMY MEDICAL UNIT 
The concept of a Clearing Hospital, as a medical link in the casualty 
evacuation chain, developed during the South African War 
(1899-1902). It was found that mass casualties held at Field 
Ambulances had hindered these latter mobile units moving with the 
Brigades which they supported. The new link in the casualty 
evacuation chain, the Clearing Hospital, was interposed between the 
highly mobile Field Ambulances, and the base General Hospitals 
which were established far from the scene of combat. The new unit, 
the Casualty Clearing Hospital, was to be mobUe and move with the 
army it supported, but was to be established in the rear support and 
maintenance areas. It was to retrieve, treat and hold casuaUies; and 
was to be the most advanced unit where skilled specialists (surgeons, 
anaesthetists and nursing officers) were present. With its definitive 
surgical role, it was to be a place where the treated would remain in 
the critical one or two week post-operative phase. The new unit was 
to consist of nine officers, a warrant officer and 83 other soldiers. 
At the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, the new unit had not 
been tested on the field of modern warfare. Extensive training in the 
British Army had, however, established combat doctrine for the 
Clearing Hospital. If a soldier were wounded, he was to be coUected 
from the field by stretcher bearers and taken to the Regimental Aid 
Post. He would then be coUected and transported rearwards to the 
Field Ambulance where life saving resuscitation or surgery could be 
performed, still in the combat zone. If he were dying of his wounds, 
he could be kept there in a place of relative shelter. Sequentially, the 
wounded would then be transported backwards to the Casualty 
Clearing Hospital for the first definitive emergency surgery, and thence 
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to the static General Hospital. Specialist surgery could be conducted 
there along with the many weeks of convalescence. 
Several British Casualty Clearing Hospitals took an active part in 
treating casualties in the first weeks of the War. By contrast, the 
Australian Army Medical Corps was in its infancy, and had 
establishments only for combat zone units up to Field Ambulance 
level. Training of volunteer medical units, such as those of the 
Queensland Defence Force, centred on battle-field casualty 
management and field skills such as the improvisation of stretchers 
from sapUngs and rope, and the horse-and-dray carriage of the 
wounded.' 
Colonel A.G.H. Butler (formerly the senior paediatrician at The 
Hospital for Sick ChUdren in Brisbane), noted that by 1914: 
In the Australian Medical Service reconstruction stopped at the Field 
Units and did not include the most important item, namely the new 
'Clearing Hospital', perhaps the most interesting unit and a vital 
link in the scheme for the evacuation of sick and wounded. Lines-
of-Communication and Base Hospitals were not organised.^ 
Prior to World War I, the Australian Government had intended that 
wounded Australian soldiers would receive their definitive surgical care 
from British Army Surgeons. However, such was the outburst of 
patriotic fervour in 1914 that the Australian Government decided to 
send at least one complete Division instead of individual units. Thus 
it was that "a fuU establishment of Base and Line-of-Communication 
medical units for an individual Division . . . namely a Clearing 
Hospital, two Stationary Hospitals (200 beds) and two General 
Hospitals (520 beds")' were hastily added to the Australian Order 
of Battle, after the outbreak of hostilities. 
This political decision, made after the country had declared war, 
had the unexpected and unanticipated consequence that wounded 
Australian soldiers were to be cared for by novice and essentially 
untrained units. Their staff were drawn from the world of the lay 
citizenry of small town and rural Australia. 
THE 1ST AUSTRALIAN CASUALTY CLEARING HOSPITAL 
In October 1914 a new order was raised to establish a new unit 
entitled the "1st AustraUan Casualty Clearing Hospital". On the first 
day of the fighting at Anzac, the Commanding Officer of the new 
unit first used the word "STATION" and after that time the unit was 
known as the No. 1 Casualty Clearing Station. It existed under that 
name for sixty years, and functioned in the Middle East and the Pacific 
Islands campaigns (in World War Two), and then in Brisbane from 
1956. 
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The new unit was first raised, in Hobart, from the rush of volunteers 
to join the newly established unit. Such was the patriotic fervour that 
80 per cent of the unit's strength had been filled within nine days 
of the first recruiting notice. 
The private soldiers who formed the new unit were destined to act 
as stretcher bearers and first aiders. Of 67 volunteers who enlisted 
as private soldiers, 19 were semi-skilled workmen and labourers, 15 
were skilled tradesmen, seven were waiters and servants. There were 
six miners, six clerks, six farmers and graziers, and nine others, 
including one medical student." 
The mean age of the men in the new unit was 23 years and only 
seven were married. Except for the medical student, there is no 
evidence that any of the private soldiers had any medical or first aid 
training. Three of the 16 non-commissioned officers (one dentist and 
two dispensers) were extremely valuable members. The typical unit 
member was thus a young single man in his early twenties who had 
left a semi-skilled or skilled trade at a week's notice. Within sk 
months, this group performed acts of great courage under conditions 
that they could not have imagined. It is certain that none anticipated 
that their designated enemy would be a Turkish soldier; and that in 
attempting to invade his land, they would be repulsed with medical 
casualties unimaginable to those who had grown up in the security 
and tranquility of Australia. In the first seven days after 25 AprU 1915, 
this essentially untrained and inexperienced group treated and 
evacuated 2700 wounded Australian and New Zealand soldiers. They 
had to do this with rudimentary medical equipment while cramped 
into a 20 metre stretch of beach, and exposed almost continuously 
to the elements, and intermittently to sheU-fire. 
The warrant officer and the 16 non commissioned officers were 
all from professions or skUled trades in their civilian occupations. Of 
the NCO's, all local men from Tasmania, one was a dentist, one a 
baker, two were pharmacists, one a merchant, one an auctioneer, and 
three were clerks. 
There were nine officers on the Manning Tkble of the new unit. 
Only two — the Commanding Officer and the Quartermaster — had 
had previous mUitary experience. Five came from Tasmania, three from 
Victoria and one from Queensland. The Commanding Officer, 
Lieutenant Wilfred Wanostrocht GibUn, was a much respected Hobart 
surgeon. Aged 42 when he enlisted, he had first been commissioned 
on 9 April 1896 (as a Regimental Medical Officer) and was appointed 
Principal Medical Officer in Tasmania on 1 July 1903, as a militia 
officer.' Five of the seven medical officers were married and their 
average age was 37 when they enlisted. Hildred CarUIe, commisssioned 
as an Honorary Lieutenant, was the son of Sir Edward Carlile of 
Melbourne. The oldest member was the Queensland physician and 
surgeon, Major Samuel Jabez Richards from Mount Morgan, 
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Queensland who died of a pneumonia-like infection, contracted after 
eleven weeks of continuous exposure at Anzac Cove. 
ENLISTMENT AND TRAINING 
The unit trained at Claremont near Hobart, in encampment, for 
approximately nine weeks. It was fully kitted out by 5 November, all 
members wearing the Australian slouch hat. A Red Cross armband 
was added later. The Casualty Clearing Hospital was established in 
camp, and the troops were quartered in tents. Gifts of all sorts arrived 
continuously at the camp, donated by patriotic civilians throughout 
the State. 
At the end of November the unit moved to Melbourne, and on 5 
December 1914 embarked on the S.S. Kyarra for Egypt, their ultimate 
destination being then unknown. The Kyarra had been commissioned 




The only known photograph of all nine officers of the First Australian Casualty 
Clearing Hospital, taken in Egypt, and signed by eight of the officers. Commanding 
Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfred Giblin (second from right, front row); Major 
Richards of Mount Morgan, surgeon an dphysician; Major John Gordon surgeon. 
Captain John O'Brien medical practioners and Honorary Lieutenant Carlile of 
Melbourne; Captains Ronald Campbell, Charles Atkins and Charles Mattel medical 
practioners, and the quartermaster. Lieutenant Edmund Boddam of Hobart. Photo 
by permission of the late Mrs. Medeleine Lawless-Pyne (nee Wilson) of "Blue Lakes", 
Cunnamulla. 
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Private Dafydd Llewelyn Stanley Williams in training at Enoggera ca. I9I6, wearing 
the soldier's uniform of the Australian Army Medical Corps 1941-1918, including the 
slouch hat, thick woollen battle dress with cloth belt and Red Cross insignia. Mounted 
troops wore leather leggings, the remainder puttees. Photos courtesy Dr. Lesley 
Williams. 
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in November, it undertook a 'milk run' round southern AustraUa, 
collecting five complete hospitals for the Middle East Campaign. To 
observe scrupulously the Geneva Conventions, the unit's horses and 
military stores were not embarked. 
The Kyarra stopped at Colombo and sailed through the Suez Canal 
to Alexandria. By February 1915 the unit was ready to receive casualties 
as a functioning uiut at Port Said, being quartered at the Metropolitan 
Hotel and then the Asile Convent. Early in March the unit was 
instructed to pack, and be ready for a major engagement in the 
Mediterranean. 
The General Staff plan for the Gallipoli assault was that the 
invading force would be enshipped at Egypt, stage through the Greek 
Islands and make an assault which was anticipated to be unopposed. 
Support elements would be landed progressively after the spearhead 
Battalions had moved inland. 
On 3 March the unit embarked on H.M.T. Malda for the Greek 
Island of Lemnos, the horses and much of the equipment being put 
on the S.S. Nizam. The unit was five days at sea, and a base was 
established at the harbour of Mudros, on Lemnos. A small component 
of the unit was established there as a camp, under canvas, but most 
o i the uiut remained on board the transports at sea. The soldiers were 
landed progressively, and some training in the form of route marches 
was undertaken. There is little in the official record to suggest that 
training was directed towards deaUng with mass casualties. On 7 April 
the unit transferred to H.M.T. Ionian. 
Two mistakes were made. Firstly, the Clearing Hospital was partly 
split up, with one small attachment ("Sergeant Syme and 4 men and 
8 horses") going to the transport ship H.M.T. Suffolk. Secondly, much 
of the Australian force was kept on board the Ionian, an unsuitable 
and poorly-maintained ship. Conflict between the Australian soldiers 
and British sailors was inevitable. The Commanding Officer's diary 
entry for 9 April reads: 
the Ionian is in disgracefully dirty state. Appointed Major J. Corbin 
as Sanitary Officer. He met with obstruction from ship's officers 
who would not supply water or materials for cleaning troop decks. 
By threatening reporting Admiralty he carried his point and effected 
considerable improvement in troop Deck.* 
The Landing Party for the Gallipoli assault — five officers and 
58 men — was named on 17 April. Two days later the landing party 
transhipped to H.M.T. Novian with bales of medical suppUes. At 11am 
on 24 April the uiut saUed from Mudros and anchored in convoy north 
of the island at 4pm. No.l Casualty Clearing Hospital landed on 
Anzac Cove at 11am on 25 April 1915 and established the Casualty 
Clearing Station on the beach. 
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Troops going in to land at Anzac Cove, 25 April 1915. Photo by Lieutenant E. Boddam, 
published by permission of his family. -
MEDICAL PREPARATIONS 
Many analyses have revealed the naivety and inadequacy of the 
medical plan to support the Gallipoli assault. Apart from several of 
the staff officers (one notable exception being Colonel Neville Howse 
V.C.) none of the medical officers or men had been in combat before. 
Bean commented: 
The officers of the Medical Corps in the Australian Imperial Force 
(AIF) were taken mainly from those of the same Corps in the Citizen 
Army. The Corps had become organised by Surgeon-General W.D.C. 
Williams since the South African War. There were no regular medical 
officers in Australia except the Director-General of Medical Services 
(Surgeon-General Williams) himself [However] the men who joined 
the Army Medical Corps included a large proportion of good 
education — artists students and others.' 
The plan for clearing the wounded from Gallipoli was drafted by 
an officer of the British General Staff. It originally allowed for no 
more than 3,000 casualties in the whole army.^ Even prior to the 
Anzac landing, relatively junior Australian Medical Officers expressed 
concern about the inadequacy of the casualty evacuation plan. 
The plan itself was straight-forward. The wounded were to be 
collected by Battalion stretcher bearers and attended to by their own 
Regimental Doctors in the Regimental Aid Posts. No.3 Australian 
Field Ambulance was to go in with the first wave of the assault, its 
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stretcher bearers hand carrying the injured to the beach. No.l Casualty 
Clearing Hospital was to go in with succeeding waves of the assault, 
from 10am. After first aid, resuscitation and any appropriate lifesaving 
measures, survivors were to be evacuated by naval boats ("tows") to 
the British Hospital ships moored off shore. The rearwards casualty 
evacuation chain would extend back to shore hospitals at Alexandria 
in Egypt, with a staging post at Mudros on Lemnos if required. 
Until ten days before the landing, the Casualty Clearing Hospital 
trained for its war role according to the formal doctrine of the day 
as an out-of-combat unit. This sudderUy changed, as the Commanding 
Officer's diary for 15 April reads: 
Lemnos. Ordered to report to A.C.G. First Australian Division 
General Carruthers. Instructed by him that Clearing Hospital would 
land with first eschelon and receive wounded direct from Bearer 
Sections of 3rd Field Ambulance and evacuate by means of Hospital 
Ships. Also we would be acting now as Divisional Troops and not 
a L. of C. Unit. 
Nine days before the assault, the Unit was given orders that the 
beach landing party was to be "five officers and sixty other ranks 
with small portion of equipment". They were selected next day. The 
five officers were Lieutenant Colonel WUfred Giblin (as Commanding 
Officer), Major Samuel Richards as officer in charge of the landing. 
Major Corbin, Captain O'Brien and Captain Atkins. 
On 19 April, the selected landing party was transferred with their 
equipment from the Ionian to the transport H.M.T. Novian. On 24 
April the proposed invasion fleet sailed from Mudros and anchored 
north of Lemnos at 4pm. It was initially decided that Lieutenant 
Colonel Giblin "would not display the Red Cross on [his] Station, 
crowded as it was amongst supply depots which the Turks might 
justifiably shell.' This policy was followed for the first few days, but 
it transpired that the Turkish soldiers scrupulously honoured the Red 
Cross. Subsequent diary entries note that any obvious evacuation of 
wounded men did not draw specific sniper fire or artillery attacks. 
This is not to say that the Hospital was not shelled (almost certainly 
inadvertently) on a number of occasions. 
The equipment that the Casualty Clearing Station took with it was 
barely adequate. Giblin's personal war diary records that in planning 
for the assault, the unit had "received jackets and breeches for the 
unit, but not boots".* The unit took with it "7 bales of dressings" 
which they had received on 3 March. The actual equipment taken with 
the unit in the assault boats was decided just nine days beforehand. 
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The Beach site of No.l Casualty Clearing Station, Anzac Cove, 25 April 1915. The 
men of the unit are sheltering under the sand cliff Photo courtesy of Boddam family, 
Hobart. 
ANZAC COVE — 25 APRIL 1915 
No better account of the events of the first 24 hours could be given 
than Giblin's war diary: 
Unit land with main body of attacking force in three tows from 
10a.m. to 12 noon. On reaching beach were allotted position for 
establishing Casualty Clearing Station [the first reference in his diary 
to the word Station, rather than Casualty Clearing Hospital). The 
number of casualties waiting to be treated was great and they came 
so quickly that nothing more than first aid could be done. Cases 
were evacuated to hospital ship Glasgow which carried 350 severely 
wounded and transport Clan McGillivray which was to take slightly 
wounded. Cases were boarded into boats and transported to ships 
by navy. The whole Clearing Hospital staff worked splendidly 
throughout the day and most of the following night. Owing to 
pressure of work and necessity of keeping the beach clear of 
wounded (in event of having to retire) it was impossible to keep 
record of all cases treated. I was especially instructed by the ADMS 
of 1st Australian Division, Colonel Howse, to evacuate as rapidly 
as possible. About 700 cases passed through hands of Clearing 
Hospital.'" 
Considering the conditions, it is a wonder that the Commanding 
Officer found time to make any diary entry at all. Overwhelmed by 
700 casualties, already accumulating before the unit had even landed 
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on the beach, and having to evacuate the casualties in darkness, was 
indeed a formidable task. The stretcher bearers and medical orderlies 
were too busy treating the wounded to attempt any sort of 
documentation. We will never known what was the exact pattern of 
the type of wounds, their distribution over the body, the varying 
degrees of severity, and the outcome from that first overwhelming 
tidal-wave of casualties. It is known that they consisted of shrapnel 
wounds, gun-shot wounds, and blast injuries from the exploding 
artUIery shells. 
Under cover of darkness, the casualties were hand carried across 
the beach and placed in the barges and converted horse boats 
("tows"). These latter had brought fresh troops to shore and were 
returning to the transports moored beyond shell range. Such 
Digging aprotectie trench for NoJ Casualty Clearing Station, Anzac Cove, April 1915. 
Courtesy of Boddam family. 
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evacuation depended on the weather, and on the protection of the 
cover of darkness. On several subsequent occasions boats full of 
wounded soldiers got out of control, and were blown partly out to 
sea before their crews could board them. On at least two occasions, 
the wounded lay helpless in them, subject to the mercy of the waves 
and wind before the boats could either be secured or were blown back 
into the shore several kilometres away. 
The men of No.l Casualty Clearing Station were crowded together 
on a stretch of beach approximately 20 metres long. Although this 
offered some protection from exploding sheUs, shrapnel was a constant 
hazard; one member of the unit (Private C.G. Conacher, No. 1402) 
received shrapnel wounds in the leg, and had to be transferred to the 
Hospital Ship Glasgow. 
FIRST WEEK AT ANZAC COVE 
In all, 2731 casualties were evacuated from the beach during the 
first seven nights after the bridgehead landing. The war diary entry 
for 26 April reads: 
Gallipoli: had beach completely evacuated by 3 am. Wounded 
continued to come in very freely all day and the same difficulties 
experienced in getting them first aid and evacuation. The only 
position possible was open beach 20 feet x 20 feet in which to treat 
a large number of cases many of great severity. We were also clearing 
for two Divisions with a reduced staff and very little equipment 
having only landed a small portion of our gear. Evacuated about 
700 cases.* 
No 1 Casualty Clearing Station, Anzac Cove. May 1915. showing, from the left. Major 
Richards, Captain O'Brien and Captain Atkins. Photo courtesy Messrs. E.M. and 
L.A. Giblin of Hobart. 
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Thereafter the diary entries become shorter and more cryptic. That 
for 27 AprU reads "Gallipoli: Pressure of work stiU kept up. The 
position of Casualty Clearing Station exposed to shrapnel fire. Several 
people being hit but not dangerously. Evacuated 659 cases." Thus 
within 72 hours of landing, the unit was organized to the extent to 
recording the number of casualties passing through its hands. Some 
30,000 men (two Divisions) were depending on this now exhausted 
unit to provide first aid, shelter, treatment and evacuation of their 
wounded. To help with the situation, a British Field Ambulance (of 
the Royal Marines) was brought in to assist on 29 April, as the 
Clearing Hospital staff had been working 20 hours a day since landing. 
The spirit of Anzac is perhaps no better summed up in the war diary 
entry for 30 April, written by an exhausted surgeon after six days of 
anguish: "Gallipoli. A quiet day . . . evacuated 199 cases." 
AFTER THE ASSAULT 
Morale remained high amongst the members of this medical unit, 
despite constant physical danger, and in spite of frustration with 
inadequate and insufficient equipment, the lack of sleep and the 
appalling stress of having to treat a never-ending stream of wounded 
and dying. Only one man in the whole unit had to be transferred from 
the beach because of fear or inadequacy. Confidential unit records 
show that 10 members of No.l C C S . had been fined for drunkenness 
between 14 and 28 February, a rate that was probably normal for the 
Australian force as a whole. However, no soldier was convicted of 
drunkenness or of any other misdemeanour after the Anzac landing 
for the entire year of 1915. Within 12 weeks of the landing, one 
member (Private M.D. Cowtan) had been awarded the Distinguished 
Conduct Medal, and eleven members of the unit had been Mentioned 
in Dispatches. 
Inevitably the conditions at the beachhead, the cold and often wet 
conditions, and the physical stress and exhaustion, took their toll on 
the unit. On 10 May, the Commanding Officer (Lieutenant Colonel 
GibUn) contracted severe influenza and bronchitis and had to be 
evacuated to the Supplementary Hospital Ship Gloucester Castle. 
Major Samuel Richards took over the command. Five days later. 
Captain John O'Brien developed severe pleurisy, and another of the 
remaining doctors had to be evacuated to the AuxiUary Hospital Ship 
Seeang Bee. On 5 June, medical manpower was further reduced when 
Captain R.D. Campbell was transferred to the Hospital Ship Sicilia, 
also suffering from pleurisy. 
The unit was under constant danger from shrapnel. On 4 June, two 
further soldiers in the unit (Private W.B. Swinton and Lance Corporal 
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A.E. Westwood) both received shrapnel wounds to the lower limbs. 
On 14 June Colonel Giblin's war diary noted that: 
The Hospital was subjected to severe bombardment for a short time 
with high explosive shells, about twenty fell in the vicinity. One 
patient was kUled. No. 1395, Private Aulsbrook — one of the unit, 
sustained a severe compound fracture of the tibia.* 
On 14 July, some eleven weeks after the initial landing. Major 
Richards developed pneumonia. He attempted to continue on duty 
as was treated on the beach, but he deteriorated and had to be 
evacuated along with the surgical cases which were arriving daily. His 
condition subsequently deteriorated and he died early in the morning 
of 20 July. 
LESSONS FROM HISTORY 
The medical lessons from the role of Australia's No.l Casualty 
Clearing Station at GalUpoli could form the text of a handbook of 
military medicine. With the wisdom of hindsight, it can be seen there 
was a lack of any real medical plan, no real appreciation of the likely 
number of casualties and a total absence of combat experience in the 
unit. There had been inadequate rehearsal and training for the action, 
there had been late tasking for a specific medical role and the unit 
was required to act in its technical and medical role before a place 
of physical safety or shelter could be established. The overwhelming 
tide of wounded meant that there could be no provision for rest, and 
medical personnel were subjected to constant physical danger for 
weeks on end, without relief. This produced casualties in itself, 
particularly amongst the officers. Finally there had been a failure to 
build any flexibility into the unit's Manning Table, and no provision 
to add on extra help. 
This last point is important. The Australia Order of Battle now 
provides that extra specialised medical teams can be temporarily 
grafted onto existing units if circumstances demand. There has long 
existed a feeling that one should economise on medical officers in 
war, a strange attitude that has persisted even after the enormous 
carnage of Worid War I. Writing in 1919 on "A Casualty Clearing 
Station at Work", Major General Sir Cuthbert Wallace wrote than 
many civilians and army staff officers had passed: 
criticism on what were considered an exorbitant number of medical 
officers who were required in [the battles in] France. But in times 
of battle it had been said truly that it was impossible to have too 
many surgeons, and in non-battle times the surgeons must almost 
necessarily be too many. That was a point which critics did not 
understand." 
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At Anzac Cove, this was learnt to the cost of the many wounded 
who could not be treated adequately. Nevertheless this newly 
estabUshed medical unit reveals some of the many strengths which 
are timeless in any consideration of combat doctrine. An analysis of 
the documents reveals there is much to be gained in cohesion from 
a unit recruited locally, with a special sense of identity, and composed 
entirely of volunteers for the specific task in hand. The presence of 
a strong officer group — perhaps elite in the professional or technical 
sense, older than the men they command yet willing to serve shoulder 
to shoulder with them in the face of grave physical danger — is a 
sine qua non of successful warfare. The symbol of the medical 
tradition at Anzac is that of Private James Simpson Kirkpatrick, one 
of the forward bearer sections, and his courage and humanity in 
collecting the wounded in the face of mortal personal danger. The 
men of the 1st Australian Casualty Clearing Station, several hundred 
metres back on the beach itself, no less embodied that spirit. 
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